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Abstract— Among civilian communication systems, vehicular
networks emerge as one of the most convincing and yet most
challenging instantiations of the mobile ad hoc networking
technology. Towards the deployment of vehicular communication
systems, security and privacy are critical factors and significant
challenges to be met. Thanks to the substantial research efforts
carried out by the community so far, we make the following
contributions in this paper: we outline security requirements
for vehicular communication systems, we provide models for
the system and the communication, as well as models for the
adversaries, and propose a set of design principles for future
security and privacy solutions for vehicular communication
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) are a new technology
that has recently drawn the attention of the industry and
academia. Vehicular communications (VC) lie at the core of
a number of research initiatives that aim to enhance safety
and efficiency of transportation systems; with envisioned ap-
plications providing, for example, warnings on environmental
hazards (e.g., ice on the pavement), traffic and road conditions
(e.g., emergency braking, congestion, or construction sites),
and local (e.g., tourist) information. In fact, vehicular networks
emerge, among civilian communication systems, as one of the
most convincing and yet most challenging instantiations of the
mobile ad hoc networking technology.
To enable such applications, vehicles and road-side in-
frastructure units (RSUs), namely network nodes, will be
equipped with on-board processing and wireless communi-
cation modules. Then, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) (bidirectional) communication will be
possible directly when in range, or, in general, across multiple
wireless links (hops), with nodes acting both as end points and
routers. Relying on such hybrid networking appears to be the
only means to realize safety and driving assistance applica-
tions, as an omnipresent infrastructure can be impractical, too
costly, and thus very slowly deployed.
A comprehensive set of security mechanisms integrated into
the VC systems is critical for their deployment. Otherwise,
the efficiency of the transportation systems, as well as the
physical safety of vehicles, drivers, and passengers could be
jeopardized. Even worse, VC-based applications can be of life-
critical nature. At the same time, VANETs are particulary
challenging to secure due to the tight coupling between
applications and the networking fabric, as well as additional
societal, legal, and economical considerations, which raise a
unique combination of operational and security requirements.
A small number of recent works are concerned with dif-
ferent aspects of security and privacy of vehicular networks,
either outlining challenges [32], [26], describing particular
attacks [19], [3] or more general attack overviews [1], offering
general suggestions towards solutions [14], [29], or proposing
mechanisms [15], [28], [21], [18]. Nevertheless, the literature
provides neither a coherent view of the VC systems, with
respect to their characteristics and the security and privacy
requirements, nor a roadmap towards mechanisms that satisfy
them.
In this paper, we seek to bridge this gap and provide a solid
basis for the development of future vehicular security schemes.
As VC is a technology in the making, our investigation draws
from the current understanding and projections from both the
academic and industry worlds. At the same time, we point out
the unique or novel aspects due to VC salient characteristics.
In Sec. II, we first provide a concise problem statement
and motivation and then list general security requirements.
Schemes satisfying these requirements could be viewed as
building blocks for any possible solution. In Sections III
and IV we compile a set of operational characteristics
and provide a minimal set of assumptions on the system
and the communication model. Then, we investigate models
of benign failures and models of adversarial behavior, and
discuss the suitability of existing adversary models for the
VC environment. In Sec. VI, we propose a set of design
principles for any security solution for vehicular networks to
follow. We conclude with a discussion on additional aspects
and connections to practical considerations.
II. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The unique features of VC are a double-edged sword: a rich
set of tools are offered to drivers and authorities (defined in
Sec. III) but a formidable set of abuses and attacks becomes
possible. Consider, for example, nodes that ’contaminate’ large
portions of the vehicular network with false information: a
single vehicle can transmit false hazard warnings (e.g., ice
formation on the pavement), which can then be taken up by
all vehicles in both traffic streams. Or, similarly, a vehicle
that meaningfully modifies messages of other vehicles. Or
even a vehicle that forges messages in order to masquerade
an emergency vehicle to mislead other vehicles to slow down
and yield.
These simple examples of exploits indicate that under all
circumstances vehicular communications must be secured. In
fact, it is possible that vehicles and their sensing, processing,
and communication platforms are compromised. Worse even,
any wireless-enabled device that runs a rogue version of the
vehicular communication protocol stack poses a threat both to
the vehicular network and the transportation system operation.
Hence, the security of vehicular networks is indispensable;
otherwise these systems could make anti-social and criminal
behavior easier, in ways that would actually jeopardize the
benefits of their deployment.
The problem at hand is to secure the operation of vehicular
communication systems, that is, design protocols that mitigate
attacks and thwart to the greatest possible extent deviations
from the implemented protocols. Securing vehicular commu-
nications is a hard problem, with a broad range of challenges
to be addressed.
Different aspects warrant distinct protocols, and thus per
(type of) protocol specifications. Instead of such specifications,
we provide next an outline of general security requirements.
The listed below requirements do not serve as specification and
are not necessarily relevant to all aspects of network operation
and all applications. They are rather stand-alone requirements
and can be viewed as building blocks towards more complex
specifications.
Message Authentication and Integrity Messages must be
protected from any alteration and the receiver of a message
must corroborate the sender of the message. Integrity, however,
does not necessarily imply identification of the sender of the
message.
Message Non-Repudiation The sender of a message cannot
deny having sent a message.
Entity Authentication The receiver is not only ensured that
the sender generated a message but in addition has evidence
of the liveness of the sender. A received unmodified message
was generated within an interval [t− τ, t], with t the current
time at the receiver and τ > 0 a sufficiently small positive
value.
Access Control Access to specific services provided by the
infrastructure nodes, or other nodes, is determined locally by
policies. As discussed further in Sec. VI, access to network
and messages is mandated by default open to all nodes. This,
however, does not preclude the need for fine-grained policies
for all other purposes, as well as the assignment of distinct
roles to different types of nodes. As part of access control,
authorization establishes what each node is allowed to do in
the network, e.g., which types of messages it can insert in
the network, or more generally the protocols it is allowed to
execute.
Message Confidentiality The content of a message is kept
secret from those nodes that are not authorized to access it.
Privacy and Anonymity Vehicular communication systems
should not disclose or allow inferences on the personal and
private information of their users. This being a very general
statement and a requirement within the broader area of in-
formation hiding, we state a narrower requirement within the
vehicular network context: anonymity.1
We require anonymity for the actions (e.g., messages, trans-
actions) of the vehicular network entities, which we denote as
nodes, with respect to a set of observers. At minimum, any of
the observers should not be able to learn if a node performed
or will perform in the future a specific action, assuming that
the node performs the action. Such a definition does not,
however, guarantee that it is impossible for the observer to
infer, with relatively high probability, the identity of the node
that performs the action in question.
To prevent such inferences, stronger anonymity require-
ments would be necessary: nodes should be almost equally
likely to have performed an action, or have strong probabilistic
anonymity, with the probabilities, as far an observer is con-
cerned, being equal for any node [23]. Or, without considering
probabilities, require full anonymity: an action α performed by
a node x could have been performed, as far as the observer is
concerned, by any other node in the system.
The definition of anonymity depends on what is the set
of the VC system entities. Or, in fact, whether entities are
partitioned into a number of subsets, for administrative rea-
sons. This implies that the anonymity requirement needs to
be modified accordingly. For example, if two non-overlapping
subsets A and B existed, a node x ∈ A remains anonymous
as long as x and any other node y also in A are equally likely
to have performed action α. However, it may be trivial to infer
that any node z ∈ B did not and will not perform α.
Anonymity requirements could be refined further, for exam-
ple, by considering the nature and capabilities of the observers.
For example, observers could share information in different
manners [30] in an attempt to either learn that a node x
performed or is more likely than other nodes to have performed
action α. Moreover, it is possible that anonymity is not a
requirement with respect to special set of observers, due to
a different system requirement we discuss below. Similarly,
anonymity may not be a reasonable requirement for all entities
of the vehicular communications system. A discussion of
specific issues related to identity management and privacy
enhancing technologies for VC can be found in [25].
Availability Protocols and services should remain opera-
tional even in the presence of faults, malicious or benign.
This implies not only secure but also fault-tolerant designs,
resilience to resource depletion attacks, as well as self-stable
protocols, which resume their normal operation after the
’removal’ of the faulty participants.
Liability Identification Users of vehicles are liable for
their deliberate or accidental actions that disrupt the operation
of other nodes, or the transportation system. The vehicular
network should provide information that identifies or assists
the attribution of liability.
This is a requirement that largely follows from the current
1Note that confidentiality is a different requirement.
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Fig. 1. Secure Vehicular Communications System - An Architectural View.
practice in transportation systems. However, liability identifi-
cation implies that anonymity would need to be paired with
the option to learn or essentially recover the node’s identity
if necessary. Specifying the types of observer (e.g., a public
authority) that is vested with the power to do so depends on
the actual scheme.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A vehicular communications system comprises a number
of interacting entities that we classify broadly as: (i) Users,
(ii) Network nodes, and (iii) Authorities. An illustration of the
system, depicting some basic only communication and security
operational aspects, is shown in Fig. 1.
Our focus is on the network operation and the commu-
nication of the computing devices, i.e., largely, the network
nodes that we define more precisely below. Nevertheless, users
(that is, individuals operating vehicles) are instrumental in
determining the vehicle behavior and the overall transportation
system operation, and thus warrant a distinction.
Network nodes are processes running on computing plat-
forms capable of wireless communication; they are mounted
on vehicles and road-side units (RSUs). We denote the RSUs
collectively as the road-side infrastructure (RSI). The com-
plexity of the nodes can vary from relatively powerful devices
(e.g., on-board vehicle computers) to relatively simple ones
(e.g., alert beacons on the road-side).
The authorities are public agencies or corporations with
administrative powers in a specific field; for example, city
or state transportation authorities. They are responsible for
instantiating procedures, as those currently in place for vehicle
registration and driver license issuance, as well as vehicular
network entities that act on behalf of the authorities and
provide services. For the rest of the discussion, we refer to
authorities only as network entities, unless noted otherwise. A
detailed discussion of the VC system operational assumptions
follows.
A. Authorities
Authorities are trusted entities responsible for the issuance
and management of identities and credentials for parties
involved in the vehicular network operation. In general, au-
thorities can be multiple and distinct in their roles and the
subset of network parties in their jurisdiction.
We denote the set of system entities, SX , registered with
an authority X determined by geographical, administrative, or
other criteria, as the domain of X . All parties in SX trust X
by default.
The presence of on-line authorities is not required, as
connectivity and communication, especially over the wireless
medium, with an authority may be intermittent. Nodes can
in general establish two-way communication with the author-
ities, even though one-way communication, from an authority
towards the nodes can be meaningful as well.
B. Vehicle Identification and Credentials
Each vehicle has a unique identity V, and a pair of se-
cret or private and public cryptographic keys, kV and KV
respectively. The binding of KV to V and the binding of
KV to other data or attributes pertinent to V are achieved by
an identity certificate or an attribute certificate respectively.
We denote a certificate on KV issued by an authority X as
CertX{KV , AV }, with AV being a possibly void attribute
list.
The vehicle identity, V , denotes the on-board central pro-
cessing and communication module. Other on-board sensing,
actuating, and processing units are identifiable locally, with
V having full control (access/read/write) over those resources.
In other words, we abstract away the complexity of the on-
board equipment, which could essentially be viewed as wired
network of its own, as shown by the illustration of an in-car
system by Daimler-Chrysler in Fig. 2. Thus, we consider a
network node as:
i. a unique identity V
ii. a public/private key pair KV , kV
iii. a module implementing the networking and the overly-
ing application protocols
iv. a module providing communication across a wireless
network interface.
This abstraction, illustrated in Fig. 2 for a car, is applicable
to vehicles and infrastructure nodes alike.
C. Infrastructure Identification and Credentials
Each infrastructure node has a unique identity, I, and k I and
KI private and public keys. CertZ{KI , AI} is a certificate
issued by an authority Z for the infrastructure unit I with
attribute list AI .
A subset of the infrastructure nodes serves as a gateway
to the authorities, or inversely, from the point of view of
the authorities, a gateway to the mobile wireless part of the
vehicular communications system. Infrastructure nodes, or a
subset of those, can be considered as more trustworthy than
other nodes, with respect to specific functionality or attributes.
For example, infrastructure nodes can be assigned the role to
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Fig. 2. Abstract view of VC system node.
transmit specific (safety or not) messages whose content is
trusted as correct or given precedence over other messages.
RSUs can be, for example, assumed to have absolute and
relative locations that are in most cases fixed and thus often
known or straightforward to infer.
1) Public Vehicles: Vehicles are distinguished in two cat-
egories, public and private. The former can include public-
safety (highway assistance, fire-fighting) or police vehicles,
aerial vehicles (e.g., police helicopters), or even public trans-
portation vehicles (buses, trams). Public vehicles, similarly to
infrastructure nodes, are considered more trustworthy, and they
can be used to assist security related operations.
D. User Identification and Credentials
Each user of the vehicular communications system has a
unique identity, U, and a pair of private and public cryp-
tographic keys, kU and KU respectively. CertY {KU , AU}
is a certificate issued by an authority Y for a user with an
AU attribute list. The user can be bound to its credentials
and secrets through some token she/he uniquely knows or
possesses (e.g., pass-phrase, biometric data).
E. User and Vehicle Association
The user can be the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle,
or in general any passenger. The association of vehicles and
users is in general many-to-many, however, at each point in
time only one user can operate a vehicle. For the rest of the
discussion, we make the simplifying assumption that the user
is the individual that operates the vehicle, i.e., the driver. User
access to the vehicle relies on the possession of a type of
credential (e.g., physical key, PIN, biometric).
F. Trusted Components
Nodes are equipped with trusted components (TCs), i.e.,
built-in hardware and firmware with two types of functionality:
(i) cryptographic operations, and (ii) storage. The role of TCs
is two-fold: to protect the vehicle’s cryptographic material
and their use, and to safeguard data usable for liability
identification.
The TCs enforce a policy on the interaction with the on-
board software, including the access and use of the securely
stored keys, credentials, and secrets. Access (read or write) to
any information stored in the TCs and modification of their
functionality is possible only through the interface provided
by the TCs. For example, the protected information cannot
be exposed through the execution of any sequence of the
commands provided by the interface. Similarly, the policies
enforced by the TCs specify the authorized entities to modify
information and functionality.
Cryptographic operations, with signature generations and
verifications expected to be the more frequent ones, are
performed without the TC revealing the cryptographic material
to the potentially compromised or faulty computing unit. On-
the-fly data and outcomes of computations are also stored,
with those corresponding to a recent interval [t0, t] maintained
if the TC is triggered by a specific event at time t, to provide
protected audit trails.
The TCs can be tamper-resistant, in order to provide
enhanced protection of the cryptographic material and other
data. Tamper-resistance can also imply that keys, credentials,
and other secret data are physically bound to the on-board
platform. It is however possible to minimize or waive the
requirement for tamper-resistance; for example, the points of
the audit trail can be signed or encrypted data.
Assuming on-board TCs is in accord with the current
state and developments in vehicle equipment, which already
includes hardware components and firmware that regulate or
record information on the vehicle operation and on its users’
inputs. Examples are speed limiters, tachographs and event
data recorders (EDRs) [12]. These may not be necessarily
tamper-resistant but they are tamper-evident, and it is com-
monly accepted, among manufacturers (more so in the US)
and legislators, that TCs will be routinely present.
IV. COMMUNICATION MODEL
In this section, we model the wireless communication in
vehicular networks, whose connectivity and membership can
change frequently, and so does the network area reachable by
each node. We focus mainly on the data link layer, and then
discuss other considerations. We model the communication
by the following data-link (denoted by the subscript L) layer
primitives and assumptions, for some radius R and time τ :
i. SendL(V,m): transmits message m to node V within
radius R of the transmitting node.
ii. BcastL(m): broadcasts message m to all nodes within
radius R of the transmitting node
iii. ReceiveL(m): receives message m transmitted by a
node within radius R of the receiver; m is processed
at a receiver V if m was BcastL(m) or SendL(V,m).
iv. A link (W,V ) exists (or it is up) when two nodes W and
V are able to communicate directly, i.e., W can receive
transmissions from V and vice versa. We denote any
4
two nodes connected by an up link, and thus capable of
bidirectional communication, as neighbors.
v. Links are either up or down, and their state does not
change faster than the transmission time of a single
packet.
vi. The network connectivity, at a particular instance in
time, can be modeled as the graph G the edges of which
are all up links.
vii. Transmissions from W are received by all nodes V i such
that (W,Vi) is up during the entire duration of the packet
transmission.
viii. Packets are delivered across an up link within a max-
imum link delay τ , or they are not delivered at all.
In the latter case, the delivery failure is reported to
the upper layer protocol. The data-link layer handles
transient network failures, it retransmits, but it does not
duplicate packets.2
Communication across the network is dependent on the
availability of sufficient resources and, in particular, band-
width. The shared medium implies that k nodes within R of
each other contend and obtain a portion of the bandwidth,
in principle, inversely proportional to k. We do not assume
that the network provides any fairness and in general the
available bandwidth can fluctuate, be unevenly distributed
among neighbors, and links be congested. Failures can either
be transient and thus masked by the data link layer, or they
can persist and cause data or control traffic to be dropped,
or prevent nodes from accessing the medium altogether. The
latter case is equivalent to having all affected links at the down.
Our abstraction of R does not imply an idealized commu-
nication model; R is a nominal range within which direct
wireless communication is possible. Yet, this can vary over
time, and it depends both on the Physical Layer protocol and
the Signal to Interference and Noise Ratio at the receiver.
Moreover, different classes of nodes may operate with different
values of R, with the ramification that this implies unidirec-
tional communication.
It is also possible that nodes have more than one network
interface. One option is to consider that multiple nodes ’run’
on each platform, with a distinct identity and credentials
for each interface. The other is to explicitly define such
heterogenous interfaces (and thus links) and consider them
as part of the node connectivity.
At the layers above the data link, different types of protocols
can be implemented often according to the targeted applica-
tions. For example, a bound on the message reception delay
can be meaningful and either asynchronous or synchronous
communication may be possible according to the system re-
quirements and the implemented network protocols. Next, we
discuss three distinctive aspects of vehicular communications.
2A distinction between the broadcast and the send (unicast) primitives
can be made: τB and τS respectively, in general different, can be defined,
depending on whether, for example, BcastL() entails retransmissions or not.
A. Multi-domain and Highly Volatile Environment
Any two or more nodes within range, or within multiple
wireless links (hops), communicate independently of whether
they are registered in different domains. This is so because
nodes can be highly mobile and not bound to administrative
and geographical boundaries. The connectivity and the set of
nodes in the vicinity of a node can change radically over time,
at different time scales. As a result, it is likely that nodes not
registered with the same authority communicate and become
associated.
B. Frequent Broadcast Communication
Unicast or multicast communication is clearly possible, as
networking protocols may determine a set of intended re-
ceivers or simply a single receiver. However, a large portion of
the vehicular network traffic is broadcasted at the network or
application layers. Restrictions (e.g., based on the location of
the sender and receivers) determine how a message propagates
across the network. In fact, the sender of a message does not
have, in general, prior knowledge of the receivers.
A second distinctive characteristic of VANET traffic is that
messages are transmitted either periodically or triggered by
in-vehicle or network events, or both. The transmission period
is in general low (a fraction of a second; an indicative value
of 0.3s), thus resulting in frequent transmissions.
C. Time-sensitive Communication
We do not dwell on the network and application protocols,
as they clearly depend on the specific instantiations. The crit-
ical nature of vehicular communications implies nonetheless
that a subset of the exchanged messages must be delivered in
a timely manner in spite of the frequently changing network
connectivity. Message delivery can be constrained by dead-
lines, with differing delay requirements for different types of
messages.
V. ADVERSARY MODEL
The behavior of an adversary can vary widely according
to the implemented protocols and the capabilities of the
adversary, whose incentive may be his own benefit or malice.
In this section, we provide a general model for the adversary,
or essentially a collection of adversary models, rather than
describing protocol-specific actions of adversaries. Then, we
discuss examples related to different types of network and
system functionality and how the related adversarial behaviors
fit the general model. We note, however, that we take into
consideration the system assumptions in Sec. III, as it turns out
that they can automatically restrict in some cases the adversary
model.
Network entities can either comply with the implemented
protocols, in which we denote them as correct or benign, or
they may deviate from the protocol definition. In the latter
case, we denote the nodes as faulty or adversaries. Faults may
not be malicious; e.g., the communication module of a node
may be discarding a message, or a bug causing a protocol to
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set a packet field to an inappropriate value. Clearly, malicious
behavior can result in a much larger superset of faults.
Before we elaborate on malicious behaviors, we first discuss
types of failures that can be benign. Crash failures [6] are the
simplest ones, with the node halting its operation. Omission
failures [16] occur when a node fails to send a subset of
its protocol-defined messages. Timing failures [7] occur when
the node transmits messages early or late, or never. Crash,
omission, and timing failures can also be attributed to the
communication environment. Moreover, they are not protocol-
aware, not requiring, for example, knowledge of the formats
of the omitted messages.
Nevertheless, we are interested in the behavior of adversarial
nodes. Viewing the adversary as the environment itself is a
possible and broadly used approach [10] whose appropriate-
ness for our setting is discussed in Sec. V-E. It is important
to note that malicious behavior includes benign failures. An
adversary can ’emulate’ any of them by deviating from the pro-
tocol definition accordingly. Furthermore, malicious behavior
can be protocol-aware: for any type of adversary we discuss
here, protocol awareness is a given.
Looking at the simpler type, the crash failures, it becomes
obvious that an adversary can withdraw itself from the ex-
ecution of the protocol, i.e., cease to generate messages, at
any point in time. Similarly, it can also elect to join again
(’reboot’) at a later point after the ’crash.’ In this sense, an
adversary can choose when it is part of the protocol and when
not. It appears this is always true, independently of whether
there may be consequences for not executing a protocol;
e.g., not being granted access to data or services. Moreover,
in a volatile communication environment, as defined above,
deliberate leaves and joins from the protocol execution can be
very hard to distinguish from actual connectivity changes.
Any wireless-enabled device that runs a rogue version of
the vehicular communication protocol stack poses a threat.
However, it is important to distinguish such devices from the
vehicular network entities (nodes). In Sec. III, we defined
nodes to be equipped with credentials and cryptographic keys;
an adversary that does not possess such keys and credentials is
by our definition excluded from being a node; we term such
an adversary as an external adversary. In contrast, internal
adversaries are, as per our system model, network nodes,
that is, entities equipped with credentials that entitle them to
participate in the execution of protocols. It is implied that
crash, omission, and timing failures, and thus the correspond-
ing malicious behavior, are relevant to legitimate participants,
i.e., internal adversaries.
Next, we consider a passive eavesdropper, an adversary that
can only intercept messages to extract or infer information
from those messages. More generally, a passive adversary
learns information about network nodes, but cannot affect or
change their behavior. In contrast, an active adversary controls
or affects the operation of network entities (nodes), in addition
to its ability to learn information about system entities.
Passive adversaries can clearly be external. Active adver-
saries can be external as well, in which case they can affect the
operation of network nodes even though they do not control
their behavior (e.g., protocols they implement). An external
active adversary cannot generate and inject message as a
legitimate system entity, yet it can act so that it appears to
be part of the communication environment.
This is possible as an external active adversary can replay
messages, that is, transmit one or more times messages that
were previously transmitted by other nodes and the adversary
received. For this, it suffices to implement the communication
part of the protocol stack.
A. Localized and Selective Denial of Communication
An (external) adversary can deliberately generate interfer-
ing transmissions and prevent (jam) communication within
the reception range of those transmissions. Similarly to the
communication model, we assume an upper bound Rmaxjam on
the range affected by a jammer. Essentially, this can take the
form of network resource depletion, with an adversary denying
communication to all receivers within its range.
It is also possible that such an active adversary jams, i.e.,
erases one or more messages, selectively. This is possible if
the targeted message(s) sender and receiver are both within
range of the adversary. The denial of communication can be
achieved through disruption at different layers of the protocol
stack (e.g., medium access control).
B. Internal Active Adversaries
In the rest of this section, we consider internal active
adversaries, whose behavior is a superset of that of external
(active) adversaries. We emphasize that the possession of
credentials and cryptographic material does not guarantee
the correct operation of the nodes; for example, nodes can
be compromised or infected. We also note that an internal
adversary can be passive; this would be a significantly weaker
adversary, meaningful only if it sought to avoid detection, and
we do not discuss it further.
As mentioned above, an adversary can omit, delay, or trans-
mit early messages it generates or relays as per the protocol
definition. A more general type of adversary modifies in-transit
messages it sends. An arbitrary alteration or corruption of
messages is also a modification; yet, simple checks at the input
to identify messages that deviate from the protocol-defined
format can render a large class of modifications irrelevant.
An adversary can forge, that is synthesize in a manner
non-compliant to the protocols and system operation, and
inject messages. Such adversaries include those that modify
in-transit messages. The basic difference of adversaries that
inject (forged) messages from all those aforementioned is that
they can initiate a protocol run.
The choice of which message to forge, replay, modify,
omit, or delay, may be independent of the message content
or message-oblivious [8]. Or it may be message dependent,
i.e., depend on the message content or messages the adversary
previously received. Adversaries can recollect past messages
they receive, as well as run algorithms to maintain a summary
of them so that essentially they recollect all received messages;
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the bounded capabilities of adversaries are discussed further
below.
Multiple adversarial nodes can be present in the network.
Each adversary can behave in any of the above discussed
models. In general, adversaries can follow the stronger model
that includes all above types of behaviors. Adversaries can
be independent, with each selecting its actions (attacks) inde-
pendently of those of other adversaries. Or, adversaries can
collude, i.e., coordinate their actions by exchanging informa-
tion, including their view of the protocol execution, and their
local states. From the assumption of the Trusted Components,
however, it follows that colluding adversaries are prevented
from exchanging cryptographic material and credentials.
The presence of multiple adversaries, especially in the case
of colluding ones, implies that the set of adversaries could
be viewed as a ”collective” single entity. This would be in
agreement with the view of the adversary as an entity that
compromises one or more network entities.
The set of adversarial nodes may be fixed, in this case
corresponding to the definition of an non-adaptive adversary.
Or, the set of adversarial nodes can change over time, with the
adversary selecting which entities (thus protocol participants)
to compromise; this would be an adaptive adversary [5]. In
the case of an adaptive adversary, it is possible to have nodes
that remain compromised throughout the protocol execution,
once they are subverted by the adversary. Or, the adversary
may attack and control one node for a period of time, before
moving to another node. This is a mobile adversary [24]; more
general, the set of compromised nodes can change over time.
We assume that adversaries are computationally limited,
i.e., have polynomial resources and computational power. This
implies that hard problems (e.g., discrete logarithm, factor-
ization) cannot be solved, and thus correctly implemented
cryptographic primitives are considered secure. Moreover, the
knowledge of an adversary is algorithmic and also limited (no
logical omniscience) [17]. Note, however, that a computation-
ally bounded adversary can still attempt, and succeed with a
very low probability, guessing attacks [22]. Finally, a bounded
adversary implies that its memory cannot be infinite. However,
recollection of all messages of a protocol run is in practice
possible if the adversary can summarize the history of the
protocol messages.
C. Bounded Adversarial Presence
Overall, at most a (small) fraction t << 1 of the network
nodes are adversaries. Such a bound as well as a bound on
the transmission range of each adversary can yield a bound on
the fraction of the network area within which communications
can be intercepted or affected by adversaries. Clearly, this
will depend on the distribution of the correct nodes locations
(coordinates) and the placement of the adversarial nodes.
In the cases of adaptive and mobile adversaries, the bound
on the fraction of adversarial nodes can be defined with respect
to a time period (perhaps, the period of the protocol execution,
if defined) or any time window. Such a bound would determine
the rate at which an adversary increases its penetration in the
network.
The bound on the presence of adversaries can be further
refined by having distinct thresholds for different node types.
For example, no more than tV per cent of private vehicles
and no more than tP per cent of public vehicles can be
compromised by an adaptive adversary. Or, no more than
tI road-side infrastructure nodes can be compromised by a
mobile adversary at any point in time. Such a distinction
can reflect the relative hardness of compromising nodes of
different types; e.g., tP < tV .
The above bounds do not preclude that a few adversarial
or faulty nodes surround a correct node at some point in
time. However, the scale, volatility, and diversity of vehicular
communication systems clue that a correct node is more
likely to encounter a small number of adversaries. This,
accompanied by the conjecture that adversaries are more likely
to be independent than colluding, was denoted as adversarial
parsimony and was the basis of heuristics in [15] essentially
following the principle of ’Occam’s Razor.’
D. Input-controlling Adversary
An adversary may be unable to deviate from the imple-
mented protocols, but it may be capable to alter the local inputs
into the protocol. In the context of vehicular networks, this can
be the case if the sensory outputs provided to the on-board
processing unit are tampered with. The complexity of such an
adversary can be in general lower than that of an adversary that
modifies and deviates from the protocol operation. Especially
if the trusted processing component protects the protocol
functionality.
It is not straightforward to classify the input-controlling
adversary as an external or internal adversary. On the one hand,
no access to credentials and cryptographic material is neces-
sary. On the other hand, messages due to the input-controlling
adversary are generated and transmitted as originating from a
legitimate system participant.
E. Discussion of other Adversary Models
The strongest model for active internal adversaries is es-
sentially the model of Byzantine adversaries [20], with the
addition of the capability to erase messages of other nodes.
Byzantine faults imply that the adversaries are legitimate
participants of the protocol(s).
This model is a powerful one, as an adversary can generate
and send arbitrary messages at any point in time and it
encompasses, yet not expressly, collusion. Overall, Byzan-
tine adversaries can implement complex algorithms without,
however, being able to generate any form of authenticator
without the corresponding secrets or keys. The assumption on
adversarial parsimony does not preclude Byzantine behavior.
It only implies that the likelihood of interacting with an
adversary is inversely proportional to the complexity of the
adversary algorithm (capabilities).
Compared to such adversaries that can arbitrarily deviate
from the protocol definition, the input-controlling adversary
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is weaker. However, it is interesting to compare it with
arbitrary malicious protocol participants which are assumed
(for example, in the case of secure multi-party computation
protocols) to fully control their local input. In contrast, the in-
put controlling adversary cannot create any arbitrary behavior,
but only induce the node’s protocol behavior by providing
input values accordingly. For example, fabricated measure-
ments that warrant an ’alarm’ can trigger the transmission of
corresponding messages.
The capability to intercept and inject any message, without
necessarily being a part of the system, has been part of
another widely used model, the Dolev-Yao (DY) adversary
[10]. A DY adversary is an ’active eavesdropper,’ able to obtain
any message transmitted across the network, i.e., receive any
message of a protocol execution (’conversation’) initiated by
any other network participant. Moreover, the DY can delete
any such message that traverses the network and can initiate
a ’conversation’ with any network participant. However, the
public key cryptosystem in use is assumed ’perfect,’ i.e.,
the DY adversary is incapable of learning anything about a
message or its digest unless it possesses the necessary key. It
is also implied that keys are under the control of the principals
and used only for a specific protocol under consideration.
The DY is also a very powerful adversary model, commonly
assumed as the adversary model in the Internet community. DY
exceeds the capabilities of the adversaries we discussed above,
yet does not capture several important aspects relevant to our
system.
In what follows, we discuss only the relevance of the DY
adversary and not the DY model of cryptographic protocols;
this method of modeling and analysis was extended and
discussed for example in [13] towards multi-party protocols,
or [2] to adapt the model for web services. We do not
dwell on the cryptographic limitations of the DY, which does
not consider the case of guessing attacks.3 We have already
assumed that adversaries have bounded resources and with
very low probability may forge a signature or invert a one-
way function; these assumptions are not dependent on the
employed cryptographic primitives.
At first, DY in our context implies an omnipresent set of
adversarial nodes, covering the entire area of the vehicular
inter-network in order to intercept all wireless hop-wise com-
munications. This contradicts our assumption of bounded ad-
versarial presence. More important, it would be an unrealistic
assumption, as the aggregate resources of the adversaries are
still bounded, yet they would grow at least at the rate the
network itself grows.
A second point of caution for the DY stems from what
could be loosely defined as the ’awareness’ of the adversary.
DY does not consider the inferences an adversary can make
from intercepted messages. In the context of authentication
protocols, [27] gives a characteristic example: the protocol
considered is such that the holder of an n-bit key transmits
3From a different point of view, the independence of DY from the
cryptosystem is positive.
one bit of the key in each message, yet it is not possible
to argue whether the DY obtained the key even though it
would clearly capture the entire key after n messages. Such
lack of awareness limits, in practice, the effectiveness of the
adversary’s actions (attacks), even though conceptually the
adversary could inject any arbitrary message. As an example,
consider an adversary that ’interprets’ the received safety-
related messages reporting vehicle sensor readings, and injects
accordingly a false-valued message, versus one that could elect
and forge the same one among all possible forged message
values.
VI. DESIGN PRINCIPLES
Many proposals to address security for vehicular commu-
nications are expected to be devised. Nevertheless, security
mechanisms and protocols to safeguard the system operation
and thwart adversarial behavior will in general differ in
functionality. Based on our investigation on operational as-
sumptions, the system, communication, and adversary models,
as well as experience from other related networking paradigms
and the to-date development of the vehicular communications
technology, we propose next a set of twelve design principles
for future security solutions.
A. Default Network Access
Messages, especially broadcasted (e.g., safety, driver assis-
tance) are by default accessible to all nodes that can receive
them. Similarly, nodes are by default assumed to assist multi-
hop communication. Furthermore, possession of keys and valid
credentials is the basic prerequisite for nodes to transmit
messages.
B. Locality and Timeliness as Privileges
As vehicular networks and the supported applications are
context-aware, only the vicinity of a node to a location or an
action to a point in time may enable specific action. Examples
are the generation or validation of a specific message or
a credential, the request and access to a service, or the
participation to a distributed protocol execution.
C. Visibility of Events
An attestation of an event by an individual node requires
that the event be visible to the attesting node; either the node
is the sole responsible for generating the event (e.g., alarm),
or it had the locality and timeliness privilege (e.g., reception
of the message within δ seconds from its generation) to
provide the attestation. More generally, events that trigger joint
computations or actions by multiple nodes should have been
visible to all nodes participating in the distributed protocol.
D. Mandated (non-circumventable) Mediation
All actions that change the security state of the network
(e.g., assignment of identities or distribution of cryptographic
keys and credentials), are mediated by a network authority.
Network authority actions cannot be circumvented by any net-
work node. For example, no coalition of nodes can substitute
an authority and issue new or revoke valid credentials.
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E. Accountability
All messages or protocol executions that affect the network
operation, or at least a critical subset of the operation, and in
particular the participation of other nodes in the network, are
auditable by the authorities. For example, alarm messages that
notify of system malfunctions must be auditable.
F. Vehicle Autonomy
Node actions and operations that do not require mediation
are autonomous with respect to those of other nodes. For
example, all nodes are able to reject messages from other
nodes, or utilize solely their local input for any computation.
We note that autonomy, however, does not mean freedom in
participating in the protocol execution, e.g., avoid relaying
messages.
G. Separation of Privilege
Reliance on multiple authorities, as well as the separation
of the roles of authorities and infrastructure, and thus the
distribution of trust, can provide increased security, privacy,
and fault-tolerance.
H. Non-frameability
Non-frameability implies that a trusted entity (node) cannot
perform actions or more generally prove that a node x per-
formed the action, if x never did so. This principle is based
on our operational assumption of authorities that nonetheless
should not be all-powerful. For example, use of a cryptosystem
that allows the authority to sign on-behalf of the registered
entity (vehicle) would not satisfy this principle.
I. Staged Response to Faulty Behavior
This principle calls for a system design with a multi-
level, escalating response to faults. More specifically, a low
assurance detection can be followed by a warning, then
self-constrained participation, a probation period, and local
containment following a report, and finally eviction from the
system. At all stages, reinstatement should be possible.
The cause behind such a principle is the difficulty in
distinguishing among benign and malicious faults due to the
network volatility, and the frequent non-critical nature of the
majority of faults. The bounded adversary presence is related,
as it renders the staged response a reasonable approach. Which
can also be assisted by the inherent redundancies in the
protocol mechanisms. Moreover, actions at different stages can
be in accord with the principle of vehicle autonomy. Finally,
eviction clearly assists towards bounded adversarial presence.
J. Reconfigurability
Reconfigurability is a principle that applies to the on-board
software and firmware (e.g., automatic download of patches),
as well as the policies that describe what services each
node provide to its peers. More generally, reconfigurability of
services provided by the infrastructure nodes (registration/de-
registration), as well as flexible service discovery (and deliv-
ery). Open interfaces to the network and security services.
Beyond its obvious practical aspects, reconfigurability can
be viewed as the means to ensure the bounded adversarial
presence. In that sense, it is related to the response to faulty
behavior, and be viewed as an additional means to ensure
bounded adversarial presence. For example, applying software
patches and updating virus definition files can prevent the
exploit of software vulnerabilities and the spread of malicious
software across the VC system.
K. Privacy Conservation
Vehicular communications should not become a weak link
in terms of privacy, providing users at least with the same
level of privacy that is currently afforded without vehicular
networks. The privacy of a driver should be protected against
private citizens and law enforcement agencies. Conservation is
meaningful in the latter case as well, whereas privacy should
be conditional to specific scenarios (liability).
L. Usability
Usability calls for ease of the user to access and utilize
the vehicular communication system, as well as to utilize
the information it provides. Psychological acceptability is one
important aspect. Simplicity and reliability of management
operations (e.g., maintenance, or refreshing of credentials)
is also crucial; consider, for example, the clearly unwanted
situation that a vehicle computer would not allow its engine to
start because a necessary ’fresh’ credential cannot be obtained.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a system model, making a
minimal set of operational assumptions. On the one hand, these
are sufficiently restrictive, to take into consideration salient
features of vehicular communication systems. On the other
hand, they are generic in that they allow for a wide range of
architectures and refinements. Furthermore, we did not dwell
on specific applications, networking protocols, communication
technologies, or cryptographic primitives.
In terms of communications, we provided a general model
that captures the distinctive characteristic of VC, the V2V
communication, but not only (e.g., V2I is also covered). The
model can be satisfied by a range of protocols, including the
the emerging defacto standard, DSRC (Dedicated Short Range
Communications), which is on the IEEE 802.11 technology
and proceeds towards standardization under the name of IEEE
802.11p [11]. Our model can be extended to encompass other
technologies, such as cellular telephony data (an integration
with 802.11 is proposed by [9]) and wireless broadband [31],
as well as directional antennas.
Regarding the adversary model, we outline a family of
adversaries again without considering specific applications and
protocols. Through a careful investigation of the literature, we
find that we cover previously described attacks [1], [32], [19],
[3], [15], [26], [14], [28], [21], [18], [29]. Another advantage
of providing a family of adversary models is that adversarial
behaviors can be composed by any meaningful combination
of those models. This is important as one cannot anticipate in
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detail any attack against any (not yet defined) protocol. Finally,
one can classify adversaries according to their sophistication
and thus likelihood to be encountered. We have not provided
such a classification here, yet, our assumption on bounded
adversarial presence or the identification of input-controlling
adversaries, clearly point towards what could be called the
more ’realistic’ or ’expected’ models. A more detailed treat-
ment of this topic, which can also become more protocol- and
application- specific, is part of our on-going work.
The security requirements and design principles we have
presented here are also independent of the system function-
ality. The outlined requirements can be used as building
blocks, but the presented list could have been longer only if
we considered particular protocols and attempted to provide
specifications. The list of design principles could also grow,
in a seemingly straightforward manner, to include principles
such as open design or graceful degradation of performance
in the presence of increasing-strength attacks.
Our investigation in this paper, focused on VC systems, is
largely relevant to other wireless and mobile communication
systems, such as mobile ad hoc networks, sensor networks,
and infrastructure-based wireless networks [4]. Our intention
however is also to identify the elements that distinguish VC
systems from other networking paradigms. Our focus is on
VC, which emerge as a promising technology that draws
world-wide support and has the potential for large-scale de-
ployment. We believe that this paper can be the basis for future
designers of security solutions for vehicular communication
systems.
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